# Anacortes refinery explosion (2010): lessons on high temperature hydrogen attack

> The Anacortes refinery explosion was the April 2, 2010, rupture of a carbon steel heat exchanger in Anacortes, Washington, that killed seven workers. The US Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (CSB) found that high temperature hydrogen attack (HTHA) had cracked the steel and that the industry curve used to predict HTHA could not be relied on.

- Label: Fact
- Type: Explainer
- Published: 2026-11-13T03:06:14+09:00
- By: Jun Zhong
- Researched and drafted by: Beacon's AI newsroom
- Checked by: Jun Zhong on 2026-11-13
- Topics: Refining
- Canonical: https://beacon.winda.ai/library/anacortes-refinery-explosion-2010/

## Why does it matter?

Reviews based on the exchangers' design operating conditions did not flag HTHA, yet the CSB found that it had severely weakened the steel [1]. The refinery's periodic corrosion reviews never named HTHA as a credible failure mechanism for the two damaged exchangers, and their actual operating conditions were not monitored, although that was technically feasible [1]. Because the CSB also judged inspection too unreliable to catch HTHA, the case shows how much rests on the data behind a damage review and on the choice of steel [1][2].

## What happened at Anacortes on April 2, 2010?

The naphtha hydrotreater unit preheated its feed in two parallel banks of three heat exchangers, A/B/C and D/E/F [1]. One bank had been cleaned and was being brought back into service while the other kept running [1].

| Date and time | Event |
|---|---|
| 1971 to 1972 | Exchangers built in 1971; the unit was constructed in 1972 [1] |
| 1995 | A hazard review of process changes that could raise hydrogen partial pressure in the exchangers did not consider HTHA [1] |
| March 28 to 31, 2010 | The A/B/C bank is taken offline and its fouled tubes cleaned; the D/E/F bank stays in service [1] |
| April 1, about 10:30 p.m. | Six more workers join the single outside operator for the A/B/C restart; two leaks are reported and, as on past restarts, treated as normal [1] |
| April 2, 12:30 a.m. | Exchanger E, in the operating D/E/F bank, splits along its weld seams; hydrogen and naphtha above 500 °F (about 260 °C) ignite; seven workers die and the fire burns for more than three hours [1] |
| May 1, 2014 | The CSB approves its final report [3] |

Sources: CSB Report 2010-08-I-WA, 2014 [1]; CSB investigation page [3].

## Why did the heat exchanger fail?

The CSB found that HTHA, a mechanism in which hydrogen at high temperature and pressure produces fissures and cracks in carbon steel, had severely degraded exchanger E, and that exchanger B, built and run the same way, was badly damaged too [1]. The damage gathered near welds that had not been post-weld heat treated, and the rupture ran along those high-stress weld regions [1]. Only the hottest of the shell sections was clad with stainless steel; the CSB estimated that this clad part at times ran above the carbon steel curve, while the unclad part that failed ran below it [1].

That curve, the carbon steel Nelson curve in API Recommended Practice (RP) 941, is drawn from past failures and self-reported, inconsistent process data [1]. The CSB concluded that it cannot be depended on to prevent HTHA failures [1]. It also found that HTHA can be microscopic and localized, so finding it depends on the technique and the inspector's skill, and that inspection and heat treatment sit low on the hierarchy of controls compared with steels that resist HTHA [1]. See [What is high temperature hydrogen attack (HTHA)?](/library/high-temperature-hydrogen-attack/) for the mechanism itself.

## What did the CSB recommend?

These are the CSB's recommendations, not Winda's [3]:

- **To API:** revise RP 941 to set minimum mandatory requirements, require inherently safer materials as far as feasible, require checks of actual operating conditions, and bar carbon steel in processes above 400 °F (about 204 °C) and 50 psia (about 3.4 bar absolute) hydrogen partial pressure; a similar revision of RP 581 [3].
- **To the US Environmental Protection Agency:** require documented inherently safer systems analysis and use of the hierarchy of controls in its accident prevention rule, 40 CFR Part 68 [3].
- **To Washington's governor and legislature:** strengthen refinery process safety rules with goal-setting features, including a documented damage mechanism hazard review, a well-staffed technical regulator and process safety indicators [3][4].

## What changed afterwards?

- **API RP 941.** API published the 8th edition in February 2016 with separate carbon steel curves for welds with and without post-weld heat treatment [2]. The CSB found that the new curve still did not cover all estimated Anacortes conditions and, on July 13, 2016, closed its recommendation as "unacceptable action" [2]. API's 2025 catalog still lists the 8th edition, with a 2020 addendum [5].
- **CSB guidance.** The CSB urged companies to verify actual hydrogen partial pressure and temperature for carbon steel equipment in hydrogen service and to replace carbon steel above its 400 °F and 50 psia threshold [2].
- **Washington rule.** A refinery process safety rule adopted on December 27, 2023, took effect on December 27, 2024 [4][6]. It requires a damage mechanism review for each process with a damage mechanism, revalidated at least every five years, including a review of operating conditions that could speed up damage; HTHA is named among the mechanisms [6]. The CSB accepted this as an alternative to its recommendation on March 14, 2024 [4].

## Where integrity problems show up

| Element or step | Integrity link | In the Library |
|---|---|---|
| Damage mechanism review | Reviews relied on design rather than actual operating data and did not flag HTHA for the two damaged shells [1] | What is a damage mechanism review? |
| Monitoring actual operating conditions | Not monitored, though feasible; had they been, company procedures would have required HTHA inspection [1] | [What are integrity operating windows (IOWs)?](/library/integrity-operating-windows/) |
| Process hazard analysis | Listed general safeguards without testing them; the 2010 analysis missed HTHA on the shell side [1] | What is process safety management (PSM)? |
| Management of change | A 1995 change that could raise hydrogen partial pressure was not reviewed for HTHA [1] | What is management of change (MOC)? |
| Material selection | Carbon steel shells where the CSB judged high-chromium steels the inherently safer choice [1][2] | How are materials selected for oil and gas equipment? |
| Welding and heat treatment | Damage concentrated at welds without post-weld heat treatment [1] | What is post-weld heat treatment (PWHT)? |

Sources: CSB Report 2010-08-I-WA, 2014 [1]; CSB HTHA safety alert, 2016 [2].

## Sources

1. [Investigation Report: Catastrophic Rupture of Heat Exchanger (Seven Fatalities), Tesoro Anacortes Refinery, Anacortes, Washington, April 2, 2010 (Report 2010-08-I-WA), US Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (CSB)](https://www.csb.gov/assets/1/6/Tesoro_Anacortes_2014-May-01.pdf?15244)
2. [CSB Safety Alert: Preventing High Temperature Hydrogen Attack (HTHA), US Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (CSB)](https://www.csb.gov/assets/1/20/Safety_Alert_HTHA_Final1.pdf?16371)
3. [Tesoro Anacortes Refinery Fatal Explosion and Fire (investigation page with recommendation status), US Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (CSB)](https://www.csb.gov/tesoro-refinery-fatal-explosion-and-fire/)
4. [Recommendation Status Change Summary, Recommendation 2010-08-I-WA-R5 (Governor and Legislature of the State of Washington), US Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (CSB)](https://www.csb.gov/assets/recommendation/Status_Change_Summary_State_of_Washington_(Tesoro_R5)_C-AAA.pdf), 2024-03-14
5. [2025 Publications Catalog (entry for RP 941, Steels for Hydrogen Service at Elevated Temperatures and Pressures in Petroleum Refineries and Petrochemical Plants) (RP 941, 8th edition, February 2016, with Addendum 1, August 2020), American Petroleum Institute (API)](https://www.api.org/-/media/files/publications/2025-catalog/2025_pubs%20catalog.pdf)
6. [WAC 296-67-347, Damage mechanism review, Washington State Legislature](https://app.leg.wa.gov/wac/default.aspx?cite=296-67-347)

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