# What is a bowtie risk analysis?

> A bowtie risk analysis is a diagram that shows how one hazard can get out of control and the barriers that stand on each path to harm. Threats sit on the left, consequences on the right, and the loss of control, called the top event, forms the knot. It is mainly qualitative and supports safety cases and barrier management.

- Label: Fact
- Type: Explainer
- Published: 2026-11-13T09:26:54+09:00
- By: Jun Zhong
- Researched and drafted by: Beacon's AI newsroom
- Checked by: Jun Zhong on 2026-11-13
- Topics: Refining, Upstream and offshore
- Canonical: https://beacon.winda.ai/library/bowtie-analysis/

## Why does it matter?

A barrier drawn on a bowtie shows that a safeguard is planned, not that it will work. In its 2014 report on the 2010 Macondo blowout in the Gulf of Mexico, which killed 11 people and injured 17, the US Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (CSB) drew a bowtie in which the blowout preventer (BOP) is the only barrier on both sides of the knot [3]. It also found that routine inspection and weekly function tests had not revealed latent faults in the BOP's emergency system, including miswiring and a drained battery in one of its two redundant control pods [3]. The CSB's bowtie lists inspection and maintenance among the controls meant to stop a barrier from decaying [3].

## What are the parts of a bowtie?

The UK Civil Aviation Authority (CAA), which publishes bowtie guidance, defines the elements below [1]. The examples in the third column come from the CSB's Macondo bowtie [3].

| Element | What it means | Offshore drilling example |
|---|---|---|
| Hazard | Something with the potential to cause harm [1] | Oil and gas in the riser above the BOP [3] |
| Top event | The moment control over the hazard is lost [1] | A kick that brings hydrocarbons into the riser [3] |
| Threats | Direct causes that could lead to the top event [1] | Cement that fails to seal; an inadequate drilling fluid column; a lost circulation event [3] |
| Consequences | Outcomes that directly cause harm, loss or damage [1] | Ignited blowout with fire and loss of life; unignited release to the sea [3] |
| Preventive controls (left side) | Measures that remove a threat or stop it reaching the top event [1] | Bottom hole cement and its integrity tests; correct mud density [3] |
| Recovery controls (right side) | Measures that lower the chance or severity of a consequence once the top event happens [1] | Diverter system, emergency BOP systems, ignition controls, evacuation [3] |
| Escalation factors | Conditions that weaken a control or make it fail [1]; the CSB calls them barrier decay mechanisms [3] | The BOP fails when needed [3] |
| Escalation factor controls | Measures that protect a control from its escalation factors [1] | Inspection and maintenance; design limits found in hazard analysis; crew vigilance [3] |

## How is a bowtie built and used?

The CAA traces the method to a simplified fusion of fault tree and event tree analysis, and notes that the oil and gas industry developed its practical use in the 1990s [4]. A team picks one hazard, defines the top event, lists the direct threats and consequences, then adds the barriers on each path and the factors that could defeat them [1]. Attributes such as barrier effectiveness, criticality and assurance measures can be added to support a safety management system [1].

UK offshore guidance from the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) describes three uses in risk assessment: documenting the lines of defense in place, supporting a qualitative check for gaps, and informing likelihood estimates for semi-quantitative analysis [2]. Numbering each barrier shows which ones serve several threats or several scenarios, which helps judge whether a proposed risk reduction measure would control more than one hazardous event [2]. HSE's example bowtie lists plant layout, construction standards, inspection and instrumentation as prevention barriers, and detection, emergency shutdown, active and passive protection, and escape, evacuation and rescue as mitigation barriers [2].

In offshore asset integrity work, the hardware barriers are the safety-critical elements (SCEs), the parts of an installation and its plant designed to prevent, control or limit major accident hazards [5]. The Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS) and the Energy Institute published a concept book on bowties in process safety in 2018, describing the method as qualitative risk assessment and barrier management [7].

## What can a bowtie not show?

- **How often harm will happen.** A bowtie is mainly a qualitative tool [4]; HSE describes it as helping to inform likelihood estimates in semi-quantitative analysis [2]. Layer of protection analysis (LOPA) is one way to put numbers on a single threat-to-consequence path.
- **Whether each barrier works today.** That depends on testing, inspection and maintenance, which is why the CSB's bowtie adds decay mechanisms and their controls [3].
- **Hazards nobody listed.** HSE notes that missed hazards are usually the biggest uncertainty in any risk assessment [2].

## Where integrity problems show up

| Element or step | Integrity link | In the Library |
|---|---|---|
| Prevention barrier: inspection and construction standards | HSE lists inspection and construction standards as barriers that keep containment from being lost [2] | What is risk-based inspection (RBI)? |
| Barrier decay control for hardware | The CSB's bowtie names inspection and maintenance as the control against the BOP failing when needed; weekly tests missed latent faults [3] | What are safety and environmental critical elements (SECEs)? |
| Performance standard for each barrier | HSE's offshore inspections found standards that were generic, without measurable criteria such as valve closure time or leak rate [5] | Performance standard (for safety-critical elements) |
| Maintenance backlog on barriers | HSE treats backlog on SCEs as a measure of how well they work as barriers and sets a target of zero [5] | [Which KPIs measure asset integrity performance?](/library/integrity-kpis/) |
| Recovery barriers: detection and emergency shutdown | Listed by HSE as mitigation barriers after a release [2] | [What is a safety instrumented system (SIS)?](/library/safety-instrumented-system/) |
| Ageing installations | HSE's ageing and life extension program calls for reassessing deterioration mechanisms and the barriers to failure of ageing structures against their planned remaining life [6] | What is asset life extension? |

Sources: HSE Offshore Information Sheet 3/2006 [2]; CSB Macondo report, Volume 2, 2014 [3]; HSE KP3, 2007 [5]; HSE KP4, 2014 [6].

## Sources

1. [Introduction to bowtie, UK Civil Aviation Authority (CAA)](https://www.caa.co.uk/safety-initiatives-and-resources/working-with-industry/bowtie/about-bowtie/introduction-to-bowtie/)
2. [Guidance on Risk Assessment for Offshore Installations (Offshore Information Sheet No. 3/2006), UK Health and Safety Executive (HSE)](https://www.hse.gov.uk/offshore/assets/docs/sheet32006.pdf)
3. [Investigation Report Volume 2: Explosion and Fire at the Macondo Well (Report No. 2010-10-I-OS), US Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (CSB)](https://www.csb.gov/assets/1/7/vol_2_final_version.pdf), 2014-06-05
4. [History and Use of BowTie, UK Civil Aviation Authority (CAA)](https://www.caa.co.uk/safety-initiatives-and-resources/working-with-industry/bowtie/about-bowtie/where-did-bowtie-come-from/)
5. [Key Programme 3: Asset Integrity Programme, UK Health and Safety Executive (HSE), Offshore Division](https://www.hse.gov.uk/offshore/assets/docs/kp3.pdf)
6. [Key Programme 4 (KP4): Ageing and life extension programme, UK Health and Safety Executive (HSE), Energy Division](https://www.hse.gov.uk/offshore/assets/docs/kp4-report.pdf)
7. [Bow Ties in Risk Management: A Concept Book for Process Safety (publisher page), Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS) and Energy Institute, via John Wiley and Sons](https://www.wiley.com/en-us/Bow+Ties+in+Risk+Management%3A+A+Concept+Book+for+Process+Safety-p-9781119490395)

Published by Winda Beacon (https://beacon.winda.ai).
