# What is a hazard and operability study (HAZOP)?

> A hazard and operability study (HAZOP) is a structured team review that uses guide words to find ways a process could deviate from its design intent. Guide words such as "no", "more" and "reverse" are applied section by section. IEC 61882 is the application guide, and 29 CFR 1910.119(e) lists HAZOP as a process hazard analysis method.

- Label: Fact
- Type: Explainer
- Published: 2026-11-13T09:39:01+09:00
- By: Jun Zhong
- Researched and drafted by: Beacon's AI newsroom
- Checked by: Jun Zhong on 2026-11-13
- Topics: LNG, Refining, Upstream and offshore
- Canonical: https://beacon.winda.ai/library/hazop/

## Why does it matter?

For 16 years from 1996, process hazard analyses at a refinery in Anacortes, Washington, worked from a written assumption that corrosion leaks were not credible in piping and vessels covered by a corrosion inspection program [2]. The US Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (CSB) found that this assumption likely weakened the evaluation of damage mechanisms; in 2010 a heat exchanger weakened by high temperature hydrogen attack ruptured, and 7 workers died [2]. Australia's offshore regulator, NOPSEMA, likewise notes that HAZOP is better at process deviations than at finding mechanical integrity failures [3].

## How does a HAZOP work?

The team splits the design into study nodes, which are sections of the piping and instrument diagrams (P&IDs) or steps of a procedure, and states what each is meant to do [4]. For each node it pairs guide words with process parameters such as flow, pressure, temperature and level to produce deviations, then records credible causes, consequences, existing safeguards and actions [4][5]. A leader keeps the team on finding problems; solutions are written down only when they are obvious [4].

| Guide word | Meaning | Example deviation |
|---|---|---|
| No (not) | None of the intended action happens | No flow through a cooling line |
| More | Quantitative increase | More pressure in a vessel |
| Less | Quantitative decrease | Less level in a drum |
| As well as | Something extra is present | Water carried in with the feed |
| Part of | Only part of the intent is met | One feed component missing |
| Reverse | The logical opposite of the intent | Reverse flow back into a supply line |
| Other than | Something completely different happens | A different material in the line |

Sources: guide words and meanings from University of Auckland [4] and University of Oklahoma [5] course material; example deviations are Beacon's own.

Course material also lists time-based words such as early, late, before and after, and parameters such as utility failure, maintenance and start-up or shutdown [5]. IEC 61882:2016, edition 2, is the international application guide for HAZOP studies using guide words, including procedural HAZOP [7].

## When in a project is a HAZOP done?

UK Health and Safety Executive (HSE) guidance describes six stages [6]:

1. Identify major hazards and check that key hazard data exist. [6]
2. Run a coarse HAZOP on the flowsheet and block diagram. [6]
3. Run the full HAZOP on the frozen P&IDs. [6]
4. Check that all agreed actions, in hardware and software, are done. [6]
5. Carry out a pre-commissioning check, including statutory requirements. [6]
6. Audit safety after a few months of operation. [6]

HSE says the same stages apply to plant modifications, with written rules deciding how much HAZOP a change needs [6]. Course material places the best time at the point where the design is firm but can still change without major cost [4]. For plants covered by US process safety management, the hazard analysis must be updated and revalidated at least every 5 years and kept for the life of the process [1].

## Who takes part, and what do they need?

Under 29 CFR 1910.119(e)(4), the team must have engineering and process operations expertise, at least one employee who knows the process being studied, and one member who knows the method [1]. NOPSEMA adds designers, maintenance staff, suppliers where needed and members of the workforce, and expects the operator to own the study rather than outsource it [3].

The inputs are the process safety information, which must be compiled before the analysis: P&IDs, materials of construction, relief design basis, design codes, and safe upper and lower operating limits with the consequences of going beyond them [1]. The quality of a HAZOP depends heavily on how complete and accurate these drawings and data are [4].

## What are the limits of a HAZOP?

- **It does not estimate likelihood.** HSE notes that a conventional HAZOP identifies hazards but not their probability; where hazards remain, further analysis judges whether the risk is acceptable [6].
- **It works node by node.** NOPSEMA warns that hazards from interactions between nodes can be missed [3].
- **It is weaker on equipment damage and external events.** NOPSEMA lists mechanical integrity failures and events such as dropped objects and vessel collisions as areas where HAZOP is less suitable [3].
- **Its assumptions shape its results,** as the Anacortes analyses showed [2].
- **Its actions must be closed.** Paragraph (e)(5) requires a system to resolve recommendations promptly, and OSHA's refinery inspections found repeat violations of it [1][10].

## Where integrity problems show up

| Element or step | Integrity link | In the Library |
|---|---|---|
| Applying "more" to pressure | Course material pairs high pressure with venting and relief rate at each node [4]; relief design basis is required process safety information [1] | What does a pressure relief valve do? |
| Reviewing materials of construction | Materials of construction appear among HAZOP overview topics [4] and in the required equipment data [1] | How are materials selected for oil and gas equipment? |
| Stating assumptions about inspection | At Anacortes, an assumption that inspected equipment would not leak from corrosion likely weakened the review of damage mechanisms [2] | [What is high temperature hydrogen attack (HTHA)?](/library/high-temperature-hydrogen-attack/) |
| Adding a damage mechanism review | After the 2012 Richmond, California, fire the CSB recommended a damage mechanism hazard review in each hazard analysis cycle [8]; California refineries must now give it to the PHA team [9] | What is a damage mechanism review? |
| Judging deviations against limits | Safe upper and lower limits, and the consequences of deviating, are required process safety information [1] | [What are integrity operating windows (IOWs)?](/library/integrity-operating-windows/) |
| Closing recommendations | Resolution must be documented and scheduled under (e)(5); OSHA found it violated repeatedly at refineries [1][10] | What is process safety management (PSM)? |

Sources: 29 CFR 1910.119 [1]; CSB Anacortes report, 2014 [2]; University of Auckland [4]; CSB Richmond report, 2015 [8]; California Title 8, Section 5189.1 [9]; OSHA [10].

## Sources

1. [29 CFR 1910.119, Process safety management of highly hazardous chemicals, paragraphs (d) and (e), eCFR, US Office of the Federal Register](https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-29/subtitle-B/chapter-XVII/part-1910/subpart-H/section-1910.119)
2. [Investigation Report: Catastrophic Rupture of Heat Exchanger, Tesoro Anacortes Refinery, Anacortes, Washington, April 2, 2010, Report 2010-08-I-WA, US Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (CSB)](https://www.csb.gov/assets/1/7/tesoro_anacortes_2014-may-01.pdf)
3. [Hazard Identification, Guidance Note N-04300-GN0107, Revision 5, National Offshore Petroleum Safety and Environmental Management Authority (NOPSEMA), Australia](https://www.nopsema.gov.au/assets/Guidance-notes/A98726.pdf)
4. [Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) Studies, University of Auckland](https://cdn.auckland.ac.nz/assets/ecm/documents/Hazard-Operability-Studies.pdf)
5. [HAZOP Studies, ChE 4253 Chemical Engineering Design and Safety (M. Bagajewicz), University of Oklahoma](https://ou.edu/class/che-design/Design&Safety-2018/Hazop.pdf)
6. [Plant modification / Change procedures (COMAH technical measures), UK Health and Safety Executive (HSE)](https://www.hse.gov.uk/comah/sragtech/techmeasplantmod.htm)
7. [IEC 61882:2016, Hazard and operability studies (HAZOP studies): Application guide (webstore page) (IEC 61882:2016, edition 2), International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC)](https://webstore.iec.ch/en/publication/24321), 2016-03-10
8. [Final Investigation Report: Chevron Richmond Refinery Pipe Rupture and Fire, Report No. 2012-03-I-CA, US Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (CSB)](https://www.csb.gov/assets/1/17/Chevron_Final_Investigation_Report_2015-01-28.pdf?15397), 2015-01-28
9. [California Code of Regulations, Title 8, Section 5189.1, Process Safety Management for Petroleum Refineries, California Department of Industrial Relations](https://www.dir.ca.gov/title8/5189_1.html)
10. [Refinery NEP First Year Inspection Results, US Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA)](https://www.osha.gov/sites/default/files/nep_first_year_findings_16apr2009.pdf)

Published by Winda Beacon (https://beacon.winda.ai).
