# What is pipeline integrity management?

> Pipeline integrity management is an operator's ongoing cycle of finding threats, assessing pipe condition, repairing defects and preventing new damage. Work is ranked by risk. In the US, 49 CFR 192 Subpart O (gas transmission) and 49 CFR 195.452 (hazardous liquids) require written programs where a failure could affect high consequence areas.

- Label: Fact
- Type: Explainer
- Published: 2026-11-13T03:06:14+09:00
- By: Jun Zhong
- Researched and drafted by: Beacon's AI newsroom
- Checked by: Jun Zhong on 2026-11-13
- Topics: LNG, Pipelines, Upstream and offshore
- Canonical: https://beacon.winda.ai/library/pipeline-integrity-management/

## Why does it matter?

On July 25, 2010, a 30-inch crude oil pipeline ruptured in a wetland near Marshall, Michigan, releasing an estimated 843,444 gallons of oil into the wetland, Talmadge Creek and the Kalamazoo River [7]. The rupture ran along a 51.6-inch crack-like feature that an in-line inspection had found in 2005, yet for nearly 5 years the integrity management program did not identify it as a threat [7]. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) found that the program relied on a single inspection technology and did not account for tool inaccuracy, actual wall thickness or the interaction of cracks and corrosion [7]. US liquid pipeline rules now in force require operators to consider uncertainties in reported in-line inspection results explicitly [5].

## What are the steps of a pipeline integrity management program?

The US regulator, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), sums up the duty as to "identify, prioritize, assess, evaluate, repair and validate" the integrity of covered pipe [1]. The federal program elements cover these steps [3][5]:

1. **Find the covered pipe**: segments in, or that could affect, a high consequence area (HCA). [1][3][5]
2. **Gather and integrate data, then identify threats**, such as corrosion, cracking, manufacturing defects and outside force. [1][3][5]
3. **Assess risk** and rank segments for assessment. [1][3][5]
4. **Assess condition** with in-line inspection, pressure testing, direct assessment or other approved methods. [1][3][5]
5. **Repair or mitigate** anomalies on a set schedule, and add preventive measures. [1][3][5]
6. **Reassess and re-evaluate** at set intervals, using what was learned. [1][3][5]
7. **Measure performance and keep records** for the life of the pipeline. [1][3][5]

API Recommended Practice (RP) 1160 (3rd edition, February 2019, reaffirmed March 2024) describes this process for hazardous liquid lines [11], and ASME B31.8S, in the 2018 edition incorporated into federal rules, does so for gas [12].

## How do the US gas and liquid rules compare?

| | Gas transmission: 49 CFR 192 Subpart O | Hazardous liquid: 49 CFR 195.452 |
|---|---|---|
| Pipe covered | Segments located in an HCA [3] | Pipe that could affect an HCA, unless a risk assessment shows it cannot [5] |
| What makes an HCA | Class 3 or 4 locations, or an impact circle with 20 or more occupied buildings or an identified site [3] | Navigable waterways, high population and other populated areas, unusually sensitive areas [4] |
| Programs due | December 17, 2004 [1] | March 31, 2002, or February 18, 2003, depending on the operator's mileage [2] |
| Newly identified HCA | Assess within 10 years [3] | Add to plan within 1 year, assess within 5 years [5] |
| Assessment methods | In-line inspection, pressure or spike test, direct examination, guided wave, direct assessment (corrosion and stress corrosion cracking only), other technology [3] | In-line inspection where practicable, with crack tools where cracks are a threat; otherwise pressure test, external corrosion direct assessment or other technology [5] |
| Reassessment | At most 7 calendar years by an allowed method; longer intervals need a confirmatory direct assessment within 7 years [3] | Five-year intervals, not over 68 months [5] |
| Records | Useful life of the pipeline [3] | Useful life of the pipeline [5] |

Source: eCFR, up to date as of 22 Oct 2026 [3][4][5]; PHMSA program pages [1][2].

## How is a pipeline's condition assessed?

PHMSA's integrity assessment fact sheet lists in-line inspection tools that use magnetic flux leakage, transverse flux and ultrasonic waves to find corrosion, cracks and other anomalies, plus geometry tools that measure deformation [10]. It notes that many tools need pipe of at least 6 inches and that hydrostatic testing is used instead of, or alongside, tool runs [10]. Gas rules allow direct assessment only for external or internal corrosion and stress corrosion cracking, and both rules require operators to allow for in-line inspection uncertainty [3][5].

## What happens outside high consequence areas?

On December 11, 2012, a 20-inch gas transmission line ruptured near Sissonville, West Virginia, in a Class 2 area outside any HCA, so it was not in the operator's integrity management program [6]. The NTSB found more than 70% wall loss from external corrosion and noted that the line had not been inspected or tested after 1988 [6]. Federal gas rules now also require assessments of certain segments outside HCAs, including Class 3 and 4 locations and moderate consequence areas, with initial assessments due by July 3, 2034, and reassessment at least every 10 years [9].

## Where integrity problems show up

| Decision | Data it depends on | What goes wrong without it |
|---|---|--- |
| Which segments are covered | Population, buildings, identified sites and sensitive areas around the line [3][4] | Sissonville (2012): a segment outside any HCA, not inspected or tested after 1988, ruptured [6] |
| How to act on in-line inspection results | Reported anomalies with tool tolerance, validated wall thickness and interacting defects [5][7] | Marshall (2010): a crack-like feature reported in 2005 was not treated as a threat [7] |
| Which tool to run | Threats on the segment; crack threats need crack-capable tools [5] | Marshall (2010): crack management relied on one inspection technology [7] |
| Whether findings apply to similar pipe | Corrosion and crack findings with material, coating and environment [3] | Sissonville (2012): corrosion found by 2009 inspections of two adjacent lines was not adequately considered for the line that failed [6] |
| How to judge internal corrosion | Gas quality, liquid sampling and internal corrosion monitoring results [3] | Carlsbad (2000): the NTSB found monitoring and sampling would likely have shown the corrosion potential [8] |

Sources: NTSB/PAR-12/01, 2012 [7]; NTSB/PAR-14/01, 2014 [6]; NTSB/PAR-03/01, 2003 [8]; 49 CFR 192 Subpart O and 195.452 [3][5].

## Sources

1. [Gas Transmission Integrity Management (GT IM) Overview, US Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA)](https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/pipeline/gas-transmission-integrity-management/gas-transmission-integrity-management-gt-im-overview)
2. [Hazardous Liquid Integrity Management (HL IM), US Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA)](https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/pipeline/hazardous-liquid-integrity-management/hazardous-liquid-integrity-management-hl-im)
3. [49 CFR Part 192, Subpart O, Gas Transmission Pipeline Integrity Management, eCFR, US Office of the Federal Register](https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-49/part-192/subpart-O)
4. [49 CFR 195.450, Definitions (high consequence area), eCFR, US Office of the Federal Register](https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-49/section-195.450)
5. [49 CFR 195.452, Pipeline integrity management in high consequence areas, eCFR, US Office of the Federal Register](https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-49/section-195.452)
6. [Pipeline Accident Report: Columbia Gas Transmission Corporation Pipeline Rupture, Sissonville, West Virginia, December 11, 2012 (NTSB/PAR-14/01), US National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)](https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/PAR1401.pdf)
7. [Pipeline Accident Report: Enbridge Incorporated Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Rupture and Release, Marshall, Michigan, July 25, 2010 (NTSB/PAR-12/01), US National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)](https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/PAR1201.pdf)
8. [Pipeline Accident Report: Natural Gas Pipeline Rupture and Fire Near Carlsbad, New Mexico, August 19, 2000 (NTSB/PAR-03/01), US National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)](https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/PAR0301.pdf)
9. [49 CFR 192.710, Transmission lines: Assessments outside of high consequence areas, eCFR, US Office of the Federal Register](https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-49/section-192.710)
10. [Fact Sheet: Integrity Assessment, US Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), Pipeline Safety Stakeholder Communications](https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/stakeholder-comms/factsheets/fsintegrityassessment/)
11. [2025 Publications Catalog (entry for RP 1160) (RP 1160, 3rd edition, February 2019, reaffirmed March 2024), American Petroleum Institute (API)](https://www.api.org/-/media/files/publications/2025-catalog/2025_pubs%20catalog.pdf)
12. [49 CFR 192.7, What documents are incorporated by reference partly or wholly in this part? (incorporates ASME B31.8S-2018), eCFR, US Office of the Federal Register](https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-49/section-192.7)

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