# Texas City refinery explosion (2005): what it changed in process safety

> The Texas City refinery explosion was the March 23, 2005, vapor cloud explosion at a refinery in Texas City, Texas, that killed 15 people and injured 180. A distillation tower overfilled during startup and flammable liquid erupted from a vent stack. The US Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (CSB) traced it to failures in process safety management.

- Label: Fact
- Type: Explainer
- Published: 2026-11-13T09:44:04+09:00
- By: Jun Zhong
- Researched and drafted by: Beacon's AI newsroom
- Checked by: Jun Zhong on 2026-11-13
- Topics: Refining
- Canonical: https://beacon.winda.ai/library/texas-city-refinery-explosion-2005/

## Why does it matter?

A low personal injury rate did not show the refinery's process safety risk: the CSB found that relying on it gave a false picture before the explosion [1]. All 15 people who died were contractors working in or near temporary trailers close to the unit [1]. The CSB's recommendations led to a national refinery inspection program by the US Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) and an industry standard for process safety indicators [3][4].

## What happened on March 23, 2005?

The tower, called a raffinate splitter, separates raffinate, a mainly straight-chain hydrocarbon mixture, into light and heavy parts in the refinery's isomerization unit [1]. It was being restarted after a maintenance outage [1].

| Date and time | Event |
|---|---|
| February 21 | The tower section shuts down; operators begin 12-hour shifts on consecutive days [1] |
| March 10 | Leaking isolation valves are added to the outage work so the level transmitter can be fixed; the transmitter repair is later put off for lack of time [1] |
| March 22 | Instrument technicians are told to stop checking critical alarms because the unit is about to start up [1] |
| March 23, 2:15 a.m. | The night crew starts filling the tower; at 3:09 a.m. the high level alarm sounds, but the backup high level switch does not [1] |
| 9:51 a.m. | Startup resumes with the outlet to storage closed, so liquid enters for more than three hours and none leaves [1] |
| 10:47 a.m. | The supervisor leaves the site and no technically trained person takes over [1] |
| 1:14 p.m. | Liquid fills the overhead line, pressure jumps and three relief valves open into the blowdown drum [1] |
| 1:20 p.m. | Liquid gushes from the 113-foot (34 m) stack; the vapor cloud ignites, most likely from an idling diesel pickup truck [1] |
| March 20, 2007 | The CSB approves its final report [2] |

Sources: CSB Report 2005-04-I-TX, 2007 [1]; CSB investigation page [2].

## Why did the tower overfill and release fuel?

The CSB's technical findings point to equipment that was known to be faulty and a startup run without the checks the refinery's own rules called for [1]:

- **Instruments.** The level indicator showed the level falling while the tower filled, the backup high level alarm failed, the sight glass was unreadable, and there was no other level reading or automatic trip [1]. These faults had been reported before startup [1].
- **Procedures and people.** The startup broke the written procedure, no extra board operator was assigned despite a staffing study, communication at shift turnover was poor, and operators had likely worked 12-hour shifts for 29 or more days in a row [1].
- **Relief disposal.** The relief valves vented to a blowdown drum and stack of a design first installed in the 1950s and replaced in kind in 1997; it was too small for the liquid and never connected to a flare, and a 2002 proposal to add a flare lost out to a cheaper option [1].
- **Siting and warnings.** Occupied trailers stood as close as 121 feet (37 m) from the drum, and eight earlier serious releases from the stack had not been investigated [1].

Its organizational findings included budget cuts and production pressure, weak board oversight of process safety, and mechanical integrity gaps that let equipment run to failure [1].

## What did the CSB recommend?

The CSB's recommendations included these [1]:

- **To the parent company's board:** set up an independent panel to review safety management and culture at its US refineries (issued in August 2005 and accepted) [1].
- **To OSHA:** run a national emphasis program for refineries on blowdown drums and stacks, strengthen enforcement of the process safety management (PSM) standard, and require management of change for organizational changes [1][2].
- **To the American Petroleum Institute (API):** guidance to keep occupied trailers away from hazardous areas, a revision of RP 521 on relief disposal, and, with the United Steelworkers union, consensus standards on process safety indicators and on fatigue [1][2].

## What changed afterwards?

- **OSHA refinery program.** OSHA launched its Petroleum Refinery PSM National Emphasis Program on June 7, 2007 [3]. Through 2013, federal OSHA inspected 61 refineries and issued 1,288 citations, 963 of them under PSM; state plans inspected 13 more [3].
- **Process safety indicators.** API RP 754 sets four tiers of leading and lagging indicators, the first two for public reporting [5]. The CSB accepted its third edition (2021) as an alternative in October 2022, noting that the drafting committee lacked the broad membership it had asked for [4].
- **Fatigue and trailers.** The CSB accepted API RP 755 on fatigue risk management in January 2021 [6], and lists its trailer siting recommendation as closed with acceptable action [2]. API's catalog lists RP 753 on siting portable buildings [5].
- **Still open.** The recommendation that OSHA require change reviews for organizational changes remains open with an unacceptable response [2].

## Where integrity problems show up

| Element or step | Integrity link | In the Library |
|---|---|---|
| Pre-startup safety review | Not done; it would have checked alarms and instruments and cleared non-essential staff [1] | [What is a pre-startup safety review (PSSR)?](/library/pre-startup-safety-review/) |
| Integrity of safety-critical instruments | Level transmitter, sight glass and backup alarm faulty; repair deferred past startup [1] | What is mechanical integrity (MI)? |
| Relief and disposal design | Relief valves discharged liquid to an undersized atmospheric drum and stack [1] | What does a pressure relief valve do? |
| Management of change for siting | One trailer approved without the siting analysis; nine others placed with no change review [1] | What is management of change (MOC)? |
| Measuring safety performance | Personal injury rates hid process risk; the CSB asked for process safety indicators [1][4] | Process safety vs occupational safety: what is the difference? |

Sources: CSB Report 2005-04-I-TX, 2007 [1]; CSB status summary R6a, 2022 [4].

## Sources

1. [Investigation Report: Refinery Explosion and Fire (15 Killed, 180 Injured), BP Texas City, Texas, March 23, 2005 (Report 2005-04-I-TX), US Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (CSB)](https://www.csb.gov/assets/1/20/csbfinalreportbp.pdf?13829)
2. [BP America (Texas City) Refinery Explosion (investigation page with recommendation status), US Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (CSB)](https://www.csb.gov/bp-america-texas-city-refinery-explosion/)
3. [Recommendations Status Change Summary, Recommendation 2005-4-I-TX-R5 (OSHA), US Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (CSB)](https://www.csb.gov/assets/recommendation/Status_Change_Summary__OSHA_(BP_TXC_R5)_C-AA.pdf), 2015-03-31
4. [Recommendation Status Change Summary, Recommendation 2005-04-I-TX-R6a (American Petroleum Institute), US Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (CSB)](https://www.csb.gov/assets/recommendation/Status_Change_Summary_API_(BP_TXC_R6a)_C-AAA.pdf), 2022-10-25
5. [2025 Publications Catalog (entries for RP 753, RP 754 and RP 755) (RP 753, 2nd edition, January 2024; RP 754, 3rd edition, 2021; RP 755, 2nd edition, May 2019), American Petroleum Institute (API)](https://www.api.org/-/media/files/publications/2025-catalog/2025_pubs%20catalog.pdf)
6. [Recommendations Status Change Summary, Recommendations 2005-04-I-TX-R7a and R7b (American Petroleum Institute and United Steelworkers), US Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (CSB)](https://www.csb.gov/assets/recommendation/Status_Change_Summary_API_and_USW_(BP_Texas_City_R7a_and_R7b)_C-AA.pdf), 2021-01-20

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