# How is inspection scope set for a turnaround?

> Turnaround inspection scope is the set of inspections carried out while a process unit is shut down, mainly those that cannot be done while it runs. It covers internal inspections due before the next shutdown, follow-up of on-stream findings and checks on repairs, drawing on the inspection plan, remaining-life and risk data, and the plant's work-approval criteria.

- Label: Fact
- Type: Explainer
- Published: 2026-11-13T15:24:40+09:00
- Updated: 2026-11-14T15:00:00+09:00
- By: Jun Zhong
- Researched and drafted by: Beacon's AI newsroom
- Checked by: Jun Zhong on 2026-11-13
- Topics: LNG, Refining
- Canonical: https://beacon.winda.ai/library/turnaround-inspection-scope/

## Why does it matter?

On 6 August 2012 a carbon steel line in the crude unit of a refinery in Richmond, California, ruptured after thinning from sulfidation corrosion, and about 15,000 people from nearby communities later sought medical treatment [1]. The US Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (CSB) found that the refinery's turnaround planning group had rejected recommendations to inspect every component of that line, or to replace the section that failed, during the 2007 and 2011 turnarounds [1]. The requests did not meet the predetermined criteria used to approve turnaround work, which by default left out anything that could be done with the unit running or at the next turnaround [1]. Thickness data, taken over the years on high-silicon fittings, suggested the line could run safely until 2016 [1].

## What goes into turnaround inspection scope?

| Source of work | Why it needs the shutdown | Public basis |
|---|---|---|
| Out-of-service examinations falling due before the next shutdown | The item must be isolated, opened and cleaned; in the UK, each examination report fixes a date after which the system may not run without a further examination | UK Health and Safety Executive (HSE) guidance [2]; UK regulation 9 [3] |
| Recommendations from damage reviews and remaining-life forecasts | Replacement or full inspection of circuits forecast to reach their alert thickness before the next turnaround | CSB on Richmond [1] |
| Checks on repairs and alterations | Critical parts that are repaired or modified are examined before the system returns to use | HSE guidance [2] |
| Relief and protective devices | Examined at least as often as the equipment they protect, some more often | HSE guidance [2] |
| Deficiencies found during the turnaround | Under US process safety rules, equipment outside acceptable limits is corrected before further use, or safely and promptly with interim safeguards | 29 CFR 1910.119(j)(5) [4] |

Scope also depends on how long the plant must run before the next stop. At Richmond, the criteria for the 2007 crude unit turnaround aimed for work that would let the unit run at least 10 years, or two turnaround cycles, until it next needed inspection or maintenance [1].

## How is the scope decided and challenged?

The CSB report describes one refinery's process in detail [1]. Planning began several years before each turnaround, and a framing document written more than a year ahead set the criteria for accepting work. A core team of an operations representative, an inspector, a design engineer, a process engineer, a capital projects representative and a maintenance representative judged each request against it. Requests that passed were ranked by weighted health, safety, environmental and production impact, and only those above a cutoff set by refinery managers were included automatically [1].

The CSB identified gaps in this process [1]:

- Requests that failed the criteria never reached the managers' review. [1]
- An informal appeal route existed but was not used by the inspection and metallurgy staff whose recommendations were denied. [1]
- Corrosion found in 2002 on the component that later failed was recorded only as notes, not in the inspection database that the core team relied on. [1]
- No senior manager was made responsible for getting the company's own sulfidation guidance into turnaround scope. [1]

The CSB recommended an auditable process for every denied or deferred inspection or mechanical integrity work item, with a route for the person who submitted it to raise it with higher management, and a technical review before any minimum alert thickness is lowered in the inspection database [1].

## What can be moved out of the turnaround?

Any inspection deferred to align with a shutdown has to be justified as not adding significant risk, and UK law allows only one postponement of an examination's due date [3].

## Where integrity problems show up

| What it finds well | What it can miss or get wrong | In the Library |
|---|---|---|
| **Remaining-life forecasts** decide what can wait for the next turnaround [1] | Unrepresentative data: at Richmond, readings came from high-silicon fittings, and a minimum thickness calculated for one small component was applied to the whole 8-inch circuit to justify a lower alert thickness [1] | [Remaining life](/glossary/remaining-life/) · [Minimum required thickness](/glossary/minimum-required-thickness/) · [What is sulfidation (high-temperature sulfur corrosion)?](/library/sulfidation/) |
| **Inspection of the selected sample** | Similar parts left out: after much of the 12-inch section was found too thin and replaced in 2011, the 8-inch section of the same steel and fluid was judged fit to run without full inspection [1] | [Corrosion circuit](/glossary/corrosion-circuit/) |

Sources: CSB final report on the 2012 Richmond refinery fire, 2015 [1]; UK Pressure Systems Safety Regulations 2000, regulation 9 [3].

## Sources

1. [Final Investigation Report: Chevron Richmond Refinery Pipe Rupture and Fire, Report No. 2012-03-I-CA, US Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (CSB)](https://www.csb.gov/assets/1/17/Chevron_Final_Investigation_Report_2015-01-28.pdf?15397), 2015-01-28
2. [Safety of pressure systems: Pressure Systems Safety Regulations 2000, Approved Code of Practice and guidance (L122, second edition), UK Health and Safety Executive (HSE)](https://www.hse.gov.uk/pubns/priced/l122.pdf)
3. [The Pressure Systems Safety Regulations 2000 (SI 2000/128), regulation 9, legislation.gov.uk, The National Archives (UK)](https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2000/128/regulation/9)
4. [29 CFR 1910.119, Process safety management of highly hazardous chemicals, eCFR, US Office of the Federal Register](https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-29/subtitle-B/chapter-XVII/part-1910/subpart-H/section-1910.119)

Published by Winda Beacon (https://beacon.winda.ai).
